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COMMON LAW PRECLUSION AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS:  
ARE CITIZEN GROUPS LOSING  
THEIR STANDING? 
Alexis E. Applegate* 
Abstract: The citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA) gives 
standing to citizen groups to bring suits against private actors for viola-
tions of the Act. Congress and the courts have established limitations on a 
citizen’s ability to bring a claim. These include notification of intent to 
file, a bar when the EPA or state has already “commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting” an action, or where the claim is barred by common law pre-
clusion doctrines. In a divided decision, the Tenth Circuit held that the 
doctrine of issue preclusion barred the filing of a CAA citizen suit in Si-
erra Club v. Two Elk Generation Partners. The court found that the Sierra 
Club, the citizen group, was barred from filing a claim even though it was 
not a party to the previous administrative action. Through an expansive 
interpretation of the parens patriae doctrine, the Tenth Circuit circum-
vented the true purpose of the CAA’s citizen suit provision. 
Introduction 
 The citizen protests of the sixties and seventies spawned an envi-
ronmental movement that spurred Congress to create an enforcement 
scheme that included a role for citizens.1 Congress included these en-
forcement mechanisms in virtually all major federal environmental 
statutes.2 Citizen suits supplement government enforcement by having 
the citizen act as a private attorney general and ensure effective imple-
mentation of environmental statutes.3 These citizen suit provisions give 
legal standing to individuals and citizen groups to bring suit against 
 
* Staff Writer, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2011–12. 
1 See Daniel Riesel, Environmental Enforcement: Civil and Criminal § 15.02[1] 
(2011). 
2 Id. § 15.02[2]. 
3 Id. § 15.02[1]; see Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 
U.S. 49, 60 (1987) (interpreting the Clean Water Act (CWA) citizen suit provision as a way 
to supplement government action). 
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federal and state agencies as well as private actors who violate provisions 
of the statute.4 
 Like many citizen suit provisions, the Clean Air Act (CAA) provi-
sion includes limitations on a person’s ability to bring a claim.5 For ex-
ample, the CAA precludes a citizen from filing a suit if the “[s]tate has 
commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of the 
United States or a State to require compliance” with the statute.6 Sev-
eral courts have also gone outside the language of the statute and ap-
plied the common law doctrines of issue and claim preclusion to the 
filing of citizen suits.7 
 Recently, a divided Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a CAA 
citizen suit based on the doctrine of issue preclusion.8 In Sierra Club v. 
Two Elk Generation Partners the court held that the Sierra Club could not 
file suit against a private party to enforce the provisions of a CAA per-
mit.9 The court first determined that the CAA citizen suit commence-
ment bar was not the only manner in which a citizen suit could be pre-
cluded.10 The court held that a previous state court decision pertaining 
to one of the permit provisions precluded the filing of the citizen suit 
when all elements of issue preclusion were satisfied.11 
 The majority then reviewed the preclusive effect of decisions re-
garding the permit by the Wyoming Environmental Quality Council 
(Council).12 The Tenth Circuit utilized an expansive interpretation of 
the parens patriae doctrine to establish privity between the state envi-
ronmental agency and the Sierra Club, who was not a party in the ad-
ministrative proceeding before the Council.13 With privity established 
and the other factors of issue preclusion satisfied, the majority pre-
                                                                                                                      
4 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006); see Riesel, supra note 1, § 15.02[1]; Will Reisinger et al., En-
vironmental Enforcement and the Limits of Cooperative Federalism: Will Courts Allow Citizen Suits to 
Pick Up the Slack?, 20 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 1, 2–3 (2010). 
5 See Riesel, supra note 1, § 15.02[2][b] (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)). 
6 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B). 
7 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Two Elk Generation Partners, 646 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(finding a CAA citizen suit action precluded under the common law doctrine of issue pre-
clusion); Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d 743 
(7th Cir. 2004) (considering the doctrine of claim preclusion in a CWA citizen suit action); 
EPA v. City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that the doctrines of 
claim and issue preclusion precluded citizens from filing a CWA action). 
8 Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1260–61. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 1263–64. 
11 Id. at 1264–66. 
12 Id. at 1266–70. 
13 See id. at 1267–70. 
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cluded the Sierra Club from filing this portion of the suit as well.14 The 
majority and dissent’s conflicting interpretations of the same case law 
discussing citizen suits, privity, and the doctrines of issue preclusion and 
parens patriae display the unsettled nature of the law.15 Despite this 
uncertainty, the majority decision may lead many state actions to pre-
clude citizen suits in the future. 
                                                                                                                     
 This Comment argues that the majority in Two Elk misapplied its 
own test for privity and misinterpreted the tests of other courts.16 The 
Tenth Circuit’s expansion of the doctrine of parens patriae allows the 
court to extend the application of privity beyond its proper bounds.17 
In order to avoid sidestepping the CAA citizen suit provision, a state 
must articulate that it is acting on behalf of its citizens to protect par-
ticular “quasi-sovereign” interests.18 And, the state must have diligently 
prosecuted the previous action to ensure the citizens’ interests were 
adequately represented.19 Without these limitations on privity, citizen 
enforcement actions are at risk of being precluded in every instance 
that a state appears as a party.20 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 The decision in this case followed an intricate path through ad-
ministrative and court proceedings at both the state and federal lev-
els.21 In 1996, Two Elk Generation Partners (Two Elk) applied for a 
CAA Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permit with the 
Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to construct a 
coal-fired power plant.22 In February 1998, DEQ issued the first version 
of the permit.23 After two years without any construction on the power 
plant, DEQ issued a revised permit requiring Two Elk to begin con-
struction by February 2002.24 
 
14 Two Elk, 643 F.3d at 1269–70. 
15 Compare id. at 1264–70, with id. at 1273–80 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
16 See infra notes 81–132. 
17 See infra notes 125–132. 
18 See infra notes 103–112. 
19 See infra notes 117–132. 
20 See Two Elk, 643 F.3d at 1275 (Lucerno, J., dissenting). 
21 See Sierra Club v. Two Elk Generation Partners, 646 F.3d 1258, 1261–63 (10th Cir. 
2011). 
22 Id. at 1260–61. Pursuant to Wyoming’s air quality regulations, the Wyoming DEQ is-
sues PSD permits to new and modified major sources of air pollution which provide spe-
cific requirements for the emitter. See id. 
23 Id. at 1261. 
24 Id. Two Elk later received an extension on this permit until August of 2002. Id. 
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 In September 2002, DEQ invalidated the revised permit due to 
Two Elk’s failure to begin construction.25 Pursuant to Wyoming admin-
istrative procedure, Two Elk appealed DEQ’s decision to the Wyoming 
Environmental Quality Council (Council).26 The parties entered into a 
joint stipulation that resulted in the final iteration of the permit.27 This 
version of the permit, which the Council approved on May 29, 2003, 
required Two Elk to begin construction on the power plant by May 29, 
2005 and not halt construction for any period of time longer than 
twenty-four months.28 On July 18, 2005, the Council issued its order 
(2005 Order) finding that Two Elk had begun construction pursuant to 
the provision of the permit.29 After issuance of the 2005 Order, the 
Council ended the case and terminated their jurisdiction over the mat-
ter.30 On August 22, 2007, however, DEQ notified Two Elk via letter 
that the permit was again invalid due to Two Elk’s discontinuation of 
construction on the plant for a period longer than twenty-four 
months.31 Two Elk appealed to the Council once again, and after pro-
viding confidential business information to DEQ, the parties reached a 
settlement agreement.32 After being presented with the parties’ settle-
ment agreement, the Council issued another order (2007 Order) ap-
proving the settlement and dismissing Two Elk’s appeal.33 
                                                                                                                     
 Soon after the Council’s 2007 dismissal, Sierra Club attempted to 
intervene in the Council’s proceedings.34 The Council dismissed Sierra 
Club’s motion because it no longer had jurisdiction.35 Simultaneously, 
Sierra Club filed suit in state court seeking review of the Council’s 2007 
Order.36 They argued that no facts in the settlement agreement sup-
ported the determination that there was continuous construction.37 On 
March 12, 2009, the court affirmed the 2007 Order, and Sierra Club 
appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court.38 
 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1261. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 1261–62. 
33 Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1261–62. 
34 Id. at 1262. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. Sierra Club voluntarily withdrew this petition. Id. 
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 While the state court decision was pending, Sierra Club filed an 
action in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming 
pursuant to the citizen suit provision of the CAA.39 Sierra Club asserted 
claims similar to those in their state court action.40 The federal district 
court dismissed the complaint after determining that the Council’s 
2005 and 2007 Orders precluded Sierra Club’s citizen suit.41 With 
slightly different reasoning, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s holding that issue preclusion barred Sierra Club’s citizen suit in 
federal court.42 
II. Legal Background 
 Before determining whether state court or administrative deci-
sions preclude a citizen suit action, courts have reviewed the com-
mencement bar provisions of the relevant Acts.43 The CAA’s section 
7604(b)(1)(B) bars a citizen suit if the government “has commenced 
and is diligently prosecuting” an enforcement action.44 In addition, 
many courts have considered other manners in which a citizen suit may 
be precluded.45 
 The full faith and credit statute requires that state court proceed-
ings “have the same full faith and credit in every court within the 
United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State 
. . . from which they are taken.”46 In Sierra Club v. Two Elk Generation 
Partners, the state court simply affirmed the decision of an administra-
tive body.47 Under federal and state precedent, an affirmance of an 
agency decision is entitled to preclusive effect.48 In determining which 
                                                                                                                      
39 Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1262. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1264. 
43 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Two Elk Generation Partners, 646 F.3d 1258, 1263–64 (10th 
Cir. 2011); Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d 743, 
752 (7th Cir. 2004). 
44 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (b)(1)(B) (2006). 
45 See, e.g., Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1263–64; Ellis v. Gallatin Steel Co., 390 F.3d 461, 473–74 
(6th Cir. 2004); Friends, 382 F.3d at 757–65; EPA v. City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d 1394, 
1403–05 (8th Cir. 1990); Wilder v. Thomas, 854 F.2d 605, 616–21 (2nd Cir. 1988). 
46 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006). 
47 646 F.3d at 1262. 
48 Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480 n.21 (1982); Goodman v. Voss, 
248 P.3d 1120, 1126–27 (Wyo. 2011). 
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preclusion principles apply, the federal court must look to the preclu-
sion law of the state where the decision was issued.49 
 Similarly, the federal court also must determine whether state 
courts in that jurisdiction would give a state administrative decision pre-
clusive effect.50 Wyoming courts use a four-part test to determine 
whether a party is precluded from filing an action under the doctrine 
of issue preclusion: 
(1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was 
identical with the issue presented in the present action; (2) 
whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the 
merits; (3) whether the party against whom [issue preclusion] 
is asserted was a party or in privity to the prior adjudication; 
and (4) whether the party against whom [issue preclusion] is 
asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in 
the prior proceeding.51 
 In Slavens v. Board of County Commissioners, the plaintiffs brought a 
wrongful termination suit in state court after foregoing their opportu-
nity to appeal an administrative hearing decision on the same issue.52 
The Wyoming Supreme Court determined that issue preclusion ap-
plied to “final adjudicative determinations by administrative tribu-
nals.”53 Therefore, after the court found that all four factors of the test 
were satisfied, it determined that the previous administrative proceed-
ing precluded the state court action.54 
 When evaluating the first element, the issue in the present action 
must be identical to either a previous court decision or a final adminis-
trative determination.55 In Slavens, the first element was satisfied be-
cause the plaintiffs sought review of whether the county had wrongfully 
taken disciplinary action against them, which was the identical issue 
decided in the administrative proceeding.56 Additionally, the second 
element was satisfied because the administrative hearing resulted in a 
                                                                                                                      
49 Brady v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 538 F.3d 1319, 1327 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Mar-
rese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985)). 
50 Brockman v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs., 342 F.3d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 2003) (cit-
ing Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986)). 
51 Id. at 1166 (quoting Kahrs v. Bd. of Trs. for Platte Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1,901 P.2d 404, 
406 (Wyo. 1995)). 
52 854 P.2d 683,684–85 (Wyo. 1993). 
53 Id. at 685. 
54 Id. at 686. 
55 Id. at 685–86. 
56 Id. 
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judgment on the merits.57 In Slavens and similar cases, the fact that the 
parties were identical in both proceedings satisfies the third element of 
the test for issue preclusion.58 When the parties are identical, the court 
can move to the fourth element and evaluate whether the previous 
proceeding was before an independent body that gave the parties a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the issues.59 
 If the parties are not identical between the two proceedings, a de-
termination must be made as to whether a nonparty was in privity with 
the previous party.60 In this instance, the federal court must look to 
state common law regarding privity.61 If no state law exists, the court 
must predict whether the state’s highest court would find the parties in 
privity.62 The Wyoming Supreme Court follows federal precedent in 
analyzing privity.63 
 When the party to the initial proceeding was a state and the non-
party a citizen group, courts have considered whether privity could be 
established when the state was acting in its parens patriae capacity.64 
The courts have recognized that states retain the right “‘to sue as 
parens patriae to prevent or repair harm to its ‘quasi-sovereign’ inter-
ests.’”65 As recognized in Massachusetts v. EPA, a state is entitled to “spe-
cial solicitude” when it seeks to protect these quasi-sovereign interests.66 
Parens patriae, however, is only appropriate where the government ar-
ticulates a quasi-sovereign interest apart from private interests.67 
 Several courts have discussed the doctrine of parens patriae and its 
role in determining privity.68 In Satsky v. Paramount Communications, 
                                                                                                                      
57 Id. 
58 Slavens, 854 P.2d at 686. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Brockman v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs., 342 F.3d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 2003). 
62 See TMJ Implants, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 498 F.3d 1175, 1180 (10th Cir. 2007). 
63 Worman v. Carver, 44 P.3d 82, 89 (Wyo. 2002). 
64 See Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1268–69; Satsky v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 
1469 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Friends, 382 F.3d at 758–59(7th Cir. 2004); City of Green Forest, 
921 F.2d at 1403–04. 
65 See Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1469 (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 
258 (1972). 
66 548 U.S. 497, 520 (2007). However, the Supreme Court has been somewhat unclear 
about what is encompassed within the definition of a quasi-sovereign interest. See Satsky, 7 
F.3d at 1469. 
67 See Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1469 (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. 
Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)). 
68 See Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1268–69; Friends, 382 F.3d at 758–59; Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1469; 
City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1403–04. 
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Inc., the plaintiffs asserted a number of common law claims.69 The 
Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court’s finding that the plaintiff’s 
claims were barred by a previous consent decree under the doctrine of 
claim preclusion.70 The court found that there was no privity between 
the citizens and the state through the doctrine of parens patriae be-
cause the state had no standing to represent the citizens’ private inter-
” when deciding that there was no longer a need 
quiring compliance with the Act and is calculated to do so.”80 The array 
                                                                                                                     
ests.71 
 In EPA v. City of Green Forest, appellants filed suit under the citizen 
suit provision of the Clean Water Act (CWA) against Tyson Foods and 
the City of Green Forest prior to EPA’s filing its enforcement action.72 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that “as a practical mat-
ter there was little left to be done” by the citizens once the EPA filed its 
enforcement action and settled with Tyson Foods.73 Although the court 
described the use of parens patriae generally, it focused its reasoning 
on the “preeminent role that government actions must play in the CWA 
enforcement scheme
for the citizen suit.74 
 In Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage Dis-
trict, plaintiffs filed a citizen suit under the CWA for ongoing sewer dis-
charges.75 Wisconsin also filed suit against the sewerage district and 
reached a settlement.76 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed 
that privity between a state and citizen groups could be established 
when the state has the legal authority to represent citizen interests.77 
However, the court established a more stringent standard for such a 
determination.78 The Seventh Circuit held that the citizen group could 
not be precluded if the state “‘failed to prosecute or defend the action 
with due diligence and reasonable prudence.’”79 Privity can only be 
established if the judicial action sought by the State is “capable of re-
 
69 7 F.3d at 1467. 
70 Id. at 1466. 
71 See id. at 1469. 
72 921 F.2d at 1397. 
73 Id. at 1404. 
74 See id. 
75 382 F.3d at 748. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 758–59. 
78 Sierra Club v. Two Elk Generation Partners, 646 F.3d 1258, 1269 (10th Cir. 2011); see 
Friends, 382 F.3d at 759. 
79 Friends, 382 F.3d at 759 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 42(1)(e) 
(1982)). 
80 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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of standards for the doctrine of parens patriae capacity and the crea-
tion of privity display the unsettled nature of the law. 
88 
                                                                                                                     
III. Analysis 
 In Sierra Club v. Two Elk Generation Partners, the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that the citizen group, Sierra Club, could not file suit 
for enforcement of a CAA permit.81 The court first denied Sierra 
Club’s argument that the CAA citizen suit commencement bar was the 
only way to preclude a citizen suit.82 The court next decided that a state 
court affirmance of the Wyoming Environmental Quality Council’s 
(Council) 2007 Order pertaining to one of the permit provisions pre-
cluded the filing of the citizen suit on that provision.83 The majority 
then held that the Council’s 2005 Order that ruled on the other provi-
sion of the CAA permit precluded the filing of Sierra Club’s citizen 
suit.84 
 The court first reviewed the Wyoming state court’s March 12, 2009 
affirmance of the Council’s 2007 Order regarding the second part of 
the CAA permit.85 It determined that the judicial affirmance of the 
administrative decision should be treated as a final judicial determina-
tion entitled to preclusive effect under the full faith and credit stat-
ute.86 The court recognized that under the full faith and credit statute 
the federal court is required to apply the preclusion law of the state 
where the decision was rendered.87 The court evaluated the facts under 
Wyoming’s four factors for establishing issue preclusion, and held that 
all four factors of the test were satisfied, thus precluding the litigation 
of the second provision of the permit.
 
81 646 F.3d 1260–61 (10th Cir. 2011). 
82 Id. at 1263–64. Although several courts have applied common law preclusion doc-
trines in CAA and CWA citizen suits, they have presumed that this is the proper applica-
tion of the law of preclusion without any further analysis or discussion. Id. at 1272 n.1 (Lu-
cerno, J., dissenting). “It is far from clear that common-law preemption survives 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7604(b)(1)(B) intact.” Id. (citing Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclu-
sions Against Successive Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens, 28 Harv. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 401, 416–25 (2004)). 
83 Two Elk, 646 F.3d. at 1264–66. 
84 Id. at 1266–72. 
85 Id. at 1264. 
86 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006); Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 
480 n.21 (1982); see Goodman v. Voss, 248 P.3d 1120, 1126–27 (Wyo. 2011)). 
87 Two Elk, 646 F.3d. at 1264 (quoting Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 
470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985)) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Brady v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 538 F.3d 
1319, 1327 (10th Cir. 2008)). 
88 Id. at 1264–66. 
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 The court then turned to the Council’s 2005 Order, which re-
viewed the first part of the CAA permit.89 The Wyoming Supreme 
Court gives administrative decisions preclusive effect as long as the de-
cision resulted from a review of disputed issues of fact in an adversarial 
proceeding.90 After reasoning that Wyoming courts give preclusive ef-
fect to administrative agencies, the court determined that the Council’s 
2005 order could preclude Sierra Club’s action.91 
 The court then evaluated Wyoming’s four factors for issue preclu-
sion.92 The issue decided in the Council’s 2005 Order—whether Two 
Elk commenced construction by March 29, 2005—was identical to the 
issue presented by Sierra Club in its federal action.93 According to the 
majority, the administrative proceedings before the Council resulted in 
a judgment on the merits, dismissal of the proceedings, and termina-
tion of the Council’s jurisdiction over the matter.94 In addition, the ma-
jority found that these administrative proceedings satisfied the fourth 
factor because they presented the parties with full and fair opportunity 
to litigate the issue.95 Because Sierra Club was not a party to the previ-
ous proceedings, however, the more difficult question became whether 
the members of the citizen group were in privity with the DEQ, a state 
environmental agency.96 
 In this case, the state environmental agency—under the majority’s 
interpretation of parens patriae—represented the interests of all Wyo-
ming citizens in the proceeding to enforce the CAA permit.97 There-
fore, the majority concluded that the DEQ and Sierra Club were repre-
senting the same citizen interests and were in privity with one 
another.98 The majority reviewed the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Satsky 
v. Paramount Communications, Inc., to determine what is required to es-
tablish a parens patriae relationship between the state and its citizens.99 
Although the court in Satsky did not find that such a relationship ex-
isted under the facts of its case, it did note that parens patriae is only 
                                                                                                                      
89 Id. at 1266. 
90 Id. at 1267 (citing Elliott v. State, 247 P.3d 501, 503 (Wyo. 2011)); Slavens v. Bd. of 
Cnty. Comm’rs, 854 P.2d 683, 685 (Wyo. 1993). 
91 Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1266–67. 
92 Id. at 1267–70. 
93 Id. at 1267. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1267–70. 
97 Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1269–70. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 1268 (citing Satsky v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1469 (10th Cir. 
1993). 
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appropriate where the state or federal governments articulate the de-
sire to protect a specific quasi-sovereign interest.100 In the present case, 
the majority determined that privity was established under parens pa-
triae despite the fact that the state agency never articulated its intent to 
protect a quasi-sovereign interest.101 Therefore, with all four factors sat-
isfied, the majority found that the 2005 Order precluded Sierra Club 
from filing a federal citizen suit relating to its first provision of the CAA 
permit.102 
 Although it is possible to establish privity between the government 
and a citizen group when the government is acting in its parens patriae 
capacity, the majority broadened the doctrine well beyond its own deci-
sion in Satsky as well as decisions from other courts.103 As discussed by 
the Tenth Circuit in Satsky, a state must articulate a specific harm to its 
quasi-sovereign interests to maintain that it is acting in its parens pa-
triae capacity.104 It is clear that a state bringing an action to prevent the 
pollution of its air or waters is protecting a quasi-sovereign interest.105 It 
is not clear, however, that the DEQ actually sought to protect a quasi-
sovereign interest.106 It merely defended a letter revoking a single per-
mit provision for one site where construction had not been completed 
and then relinquished its right to sue through a settlement.107 
 In addition, during its defense of the appeal before the Council, 
the DEQ never actually articulated that it was acting to protect the 
state’s quasi-sovereign interest or that it was acting within its parens pa-
triae capacity.108 In fact, the DEQ was not even the party that brought 
the appeal before the Council.109 It is also unclear whether the “special 
solicitude” normally afforded to Wyoming in a federal action should 
                                                                                                                      
100 Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1469. 
101 Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1274–75 (Lucerno, J., dissenting). 
102 Id. at 1269–70 (majority opinion). 
103 Id. at 1272 (Lucerno, J., dissenting); see Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. Milwaukee 
Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d 743, 759 (7th Cir. 2004) (requiring a judicial action with 
diligent prosecution of the matter before it before preclusion law can apply); Satsky, 7 F.3d 
at 1469(discussing that a state only acts within its parens patriae capacity when it articulates 
that it is protecting a quasi-sovereign interest and therefore representing all Wyoming 
citizens); EPA v. City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d 1394, 1404 (8th Cir. 1990) (describing 
parens patriae in a very general sense but applying a different reasoning for preclusion of 
a citizen suit). 
104 Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1469 (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel. Ba-
rez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)). 
105 Id. 
106 See Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1275 (Lucerno, J., dissenting); Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1469. 
107 See Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1275 (Lucerno, J., dissenting). 
108 See id. 
109 Id. at 1275–76. 
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extend to this situation because the DEQ did not articulate a harm to 
Wyoming’s quasi-sovereign interest.110 If this solicitude applied, a fed-
eral court would have to give preclusive effect to an administrative ac-
tion that the state merely defended on appeal.111 This takes parens pa-
triae and the special solicitude afforded to states too far.112 
 Although the majority used precedent of other circuits to justify its 
findings,113 it misapplied these decisions to come to its conclusion.114 
For example, the majority in the present case failed to note that the 
previous action in Satsky was before a federal court where the attorney 
general had claimed that he was acting on behalf of all of its citizens.115 
In EPA v. City of Green Forest, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
cussed a broad standard for the doctrine of parens patriae, but it did 
not apply this standard and instead focused on the fact that there was 
little left to be done through the citizen suit after EPA’s enforcement 
action.116 
 Of the privity analyses considered by the majority, the framework 
presented in Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewer-
age District most adequately addresses the concerns of the state as well as 
those of Congress in their creation of citizen suit provisions.117 In that 
case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied a stricter privity 
standard, which recognized that a third party cannot be precluded 
through privity when the representative party did not diligently prose-
cute the previous case.118 The court reviewed the language of the 
commencement bar of the statute to determine the meaning of “dili-
gent prosecution.”119 The court reasoned that a diligent prosecution is 
a judicial action that can achieve compliance with the statute and is 
“calculated to do so.”120 
 In reviewing the Seventh Circuit’s framework, it is difficult to un-
derstand the broad interpretation applied by the majority in the pre-
sent case.121 Even assuming that the Council’s administrative proceed-
                                                                                                                      
110 See id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–20 (2007)). 
111 Id. at 1276. 
112 See id. 
113 Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1268–70. 
114 Id. at 1275–79 (Lucerno, J., dissenting). 
115 Id. at 1275–76. 
116 921 F.2d at 1404. 
117 See Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1277–79 (Lucerno, J., dissenting). 
118 See Friends, 382 F.3d at 759. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
121 Compare Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1269, with Friends, 382 F.3d at 759. 
2012] Citizen Suits, Preclusion Doctrines, and the Clean Air Act 13 
ing qualifies as a “judicial action” under the Seventh Circuit’s frame-
work, there was never an actual prosecution of Two Elk before the 
Council.122 Instead, Two Elk appealed DEQ’s notification letter before 
the Council, which resulted in a settlement.123 Sending a notification 
letter and relinquishing the right to sue is not a prosecution, much less 
a diligent one.124 
 In addition to the misapplication of other federal courts’ parens 
patriae analyses, the majority decided not to apply the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s recent privity analysis in Taylor v. Sturgell.125 The majority in the 
present case is correct that the Supreme Court did not specifically refer 
to the doctrine of parens patriae in its discussion of privity and virtual 
representation.126 The Supreme Court, however, did discuss the possi-
bility of establishing privity in limited circumstances such as class ac-
tions and suits brought by trustees, guardians, or other fiduciaries 
where the initial party “adequately represents” the interests of the non-
party.127 The Court recognized the factors that must be considered in 
order to afford due process to the individuals being adequately repre-
sented.128 
A party’s representation of a nonparty is ‘adequate’ for pre-
clusion purposes only if, at a minimum: (1) the interests of 
the nonparty and her representative are aligned129 and (2) ei-
ther the party understood herself to be acting in a representa-
tive capacity or the original court took care to protect the in-
terests of the nonparty.130 
                                                                                                                      
122 See Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1279 (Lucerno, J., dissenting). 
123 Id. at 1261–62 (majority opinion). 
124 See id. at 1279 (Lucerno, J., dissenting). The Seventh Circuit even noted that a let-
ter should not qualify as commencing or prosecuting an action. Friends, 382 F.3d at 756. 
Further supporting the Seventh Circuit’s narrower interpretation of parens patriae in 
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127 Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894–95. 
128 Id. at 900–01. 
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In Two Elk, DEQ did not articulate an understanding that they were act-
ing in their representative capacity under the doctrine of parens pa-
triae, and it is not clear that the interests of the state and the citizens 
were aligned.131 By adopting this expansive view of parens patriae, the 
majority in the present case seems to be extending the concept of priv-
ity beyond the bounds recognized by the Supreme Court.132 
Conclusion 
 The majority in Sierra Club v. Two Elk Generation Partners misapplied 
the Tenth Circuit’s own test for privity as well as those of other courts 
through its relaxed use of the doctrine of parens patriae.133 The Tenth 
Circuit expanded the doctrine of parens patriae to decide that a state 
agency represented the interests of all of the state’s citizenry, thereby 
circumventing the true purpose of the CAA citizen suit provisions.134 
Congress created the citizen suit provisions to supplement and better 
ensure effective enforcement of the CAA, and the Tenth Circuit’s deci-
sion failed to give effect to that end.135 
 
131 See Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1275–76 (Lucerno, J., dissenting). 
132 See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 904; Two Elk, 646 F.3d at 1276 (Lucerno, J., dissenting). 
133 See supra notes 113–132. 
134 See supra notes 103–112. 
135 See supra notes 1–7. 
